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ABSTRACT
Private equity’s original purpose was to optimize companies’ governance and
operations. Reuniting ownership and control in corporate America, the
leveraged buyout (or the mere threat thereof) undoubtedly helped reform
management practices in a broad swath of U.S. companies. Due to mounting
competitive pressures, however, private equity is finding relatively fewer
underperforming companies to fix. This is particularly true of U.S. public
companies, which are continuously dogged by activist hedge funds and other
empowered shareholders looking for any sign of slack.
In response, private equity is shifting its center of gravity away from
governance reform, towards a dizzying array of new tactics and new asset
classes. Large private equity firms now simultaneously run leveraged buyout
funds, credit funds, real estate funds, alternative investments funds, and even
hedge funds. The difficulty is that some of the new money-making strategies are
less likely to be value increasing than governance and operational
improvements. Moreover, they introduce conflicts of interest and complexities
that alter private equity’s role in corporate governance. Private equity’s
governance advantage has always been to ensure that companies are the servant
of only one master. Yet today the master itself may have divided loyalties and
attention. With few gains left to be had from governance reforms, private equity
is quietly distancing itself from the corporate governance revolution that it
helped bring about.
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INTRODUCTION
Every business school student in the United States has heard some version of
the following tale, designed to show that private equity ownership is superior to
the public-company governance model. It begins with a description of the pre1980s bad old days, in which entrenched, lazy, and cash-hoarding management
went unchecked in public companies, while passive shareholders could only
look on in dismay.1 But lo, private equity suddenly emerged as a knight in
shining armor, reuniting ownership and control in corporate America and
turning bloated, inefficient companies into slimmed-down cash machines.2 It is
a nice tale—for shareholders, certainly—but one that may no longer be true,
because along the way both private equity and public companies have changed.
Take public companies. The rise of institutional investors, the widespread
adoption of the shareholder value gospel, and the flourishing market for
corporate control have put a stake in unrepentant managerialism. Most visibly,
hedge fund activists began seriously taking American management to task in the
2000s and never looked back.3 The threat of activist campaigns has altered
management practices not only at the firms they target, but at most public firms.4
While U.S. public companies today are far from perfect, they can no longer get
away with merely gesturing toward shareholder interests.5 As others have noted,
there are diminishing marginal returns for corporate governance improvements
in any given firm,6 and for most firms and most industries, it appears that we are
already close to the plateau.

1

See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986) (describing agency problems in large public
corporations in the 1980s, including management’s incentives to retain too much cash in the
corporation, rather than returning it to shareholders).
2
See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1989, at 61, 61-62.
3
See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 889,
896 (2013).
4
See DELOITTE, CFO SIGNALS: WHAT NORTH AMERICA’S TOP FINANCE EXECUTIVES ARE
THINKING—AND DOING 3 (2015) (“About half of CFOs say their companies have made at
least one major business decision specifically in response to activism.”); Nickolay Gantchev,
Oleg R. Gredil & Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Governance Under the Gun: Spillover Effects of
Hedge Fund Activism, REV. FIN., Nov. 16, 2018, at 1, 1 (discussing how threat of hedge fund
activism impacts behavior of non-targeted firms).
5
See Martin Lipton, Watchtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds
and Other Activist Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 25,
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/25/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-andother-activist-investors-2/ [https://perma.cc/L3KZ-JRBJ] (stating that every company
“should regularly review its business portfolio and strategy and its governance and executive
compensation issues” to prevent activist attacks).
6
See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1818 (2008).
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At the same time, private equity’s business model has changed almost beyond
recognition. The classic private equity strategy is the leveraged buyout (“LBO”),
in which the fund acquires a public or private company, levers up its capital
structure, makes operational improvements, and then sells the company or takes
it public after a few years.7 The potential governance advantages of LBOs are
many, including the sponsors’ willingness to cut costs and replace management,
the disciplining effect of high leverage, the careful monitoring provided by a
small, incentivized board that meets frequently, and so on.8 The private equity
model is getting squeezed on all sides, however. The newly reformed crop of
public companies means that there are simply fewer gains to be had from
improving U.S. companies’ governance and operations by taking them private;
activist hedge funds and other institutional investors have already done the
heavy lifting. Tellingly, the major studies showing that LBOs have a positive
impact on firms’ governance and operations tend to draw data from earlier
decades or from abroad,9 with rare exceptions.10
Meanwhile, private equity is also struggling to find private targets to acquire
and improve. Large companies today are finding it easier to grow through
acquisitions than organically.11 These so-called “strategic” acquirers are
snatching up private firms eager for capital that in the past would have been ideal
candidates for private equity acquisitions.12 Separately, venture capital funds are
expanding into fields beyond tech, holding onto portfolio companies for longer,
and even becoming comfortable with debt financing, further crowding out
private equity.13 Unlike with its public-company targets, private equity surely

7
See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J.
ECON. PERSP. 121, 124-25, 128-29 (2009).
8
See id. at 130-32.
9
See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence
from Private Equity, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 368, 370 (2012) (examining LBO data from Western
Europe, between 1991 and 2007); Shai Bernstein et al., Private Equity and Industry
Performance, 63 MGMT. SCI. 1198, 1198 (2017) (using global data between 1991 and 2009);
Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, Do Private Equity Owned Firms Have
Better Management Practices?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 442, 442 (2015) (presenting global data
on management practices at private equity-owned firms); Serdar Aldatmaz & Gregory W.
Brown, Private Equity in the Global Economy: Evidence on Industry Spillovers 4 (29th
Annual Conference on Financial Economics & Accounting 2018, Univ. N.C. Kenan-Flagler
Research Paper No. 2013-9, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=218
9707 (presenting data on private equity investments in forty-eight countries).
10
See, e.g., Shai Bernstein & Albert Sheen, The Operational Consequences of Private
Equity Buyouts: Evidence from the Restaurant Industry, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 2387, 2394-95
(2016) (examining data from Florida restaurants between 2002 and 2012).
11
See Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1690 (2013).
12
Id.
13
See Howard Marks, What to Know Before Going into Venture Debt, FORBES (May 13,
2018, 9:03 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardmarks/2018/05/13/what-to-knowbefore-going-into-venture-debt/#c68e86b78b24 [https://perma.cc/977X-PHV8].
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still shines at improving governance and operations in small, private
companies—particularly family-owned businesses.14 The question is whether
these firms can be reached before others swoop in. While private equity today is
awash (and perhaps drowning) in cash,15 so is everyone else. That means firm
valuations are soaring, making it less likely that private equity will find attractive
targets and that its returns will remain high for much longer.16
These competitive pressures are already manifesting in the data. A growing
body of empirical studies finds that private equity returns are substantially lower
than sponsors generally claim.17 More revealing still, the return data show that
private equity investments now perform either worse than, or no better than,
leveraged investments in public equities.18 Simply put, private equity’s primary
contribution to U.S. firms today appears to be cheap debt financing, rather than
governance, strategy, and operations.19 Nowhere is the decline of the traditional

14
See Bloom, Sadun & Van Reenen, supra note 9, at 444 (finding that private equityowned firms employ superior management practices to family-owned firms, but not to public
companies with dispersed share ownership).
15
See Javier Espinoza, Private Equity Funds Active in Market Reach All-Time High, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c74e10c6-47d2-11e8-8ae9-4b5ddcca99
b3 (describing record-breaking fundraising by private equity funds).
16
See BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2018, at 4-5 (2018), https://www.bain
.com/contentassets/3edd976974b8409da6d5569c71533213/bain_report_2018_private_equit
y_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DTT3-YJ2N] (finding that valuation multiples are at “historic
highs,” exceeding even levels seen immediately prior to the global financial crisis).
17
First, a series of papers documents the decline in private equity fund returns over time.
See, e.g., Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson & Steven N. Kaplan, How Do Private Equity
Investments Perform Compared to Public Equity?, 14 J. INV. MGMT. 14, 15 (2016); Ludovic
Phalippou, Performance of Buyout Funds Revisited?, 18 REV. FIN. 189, 189 (2014); Ludovic
Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The Performance of Private Equity Funds, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1747, 1747 (2009); Berk A. Sensoy, Yingdi Wang & Michael S. Weibach, Limited
Partner Performance and the Maturing of the Private Equity Industry, 112 J. FIN. ECON. 320,
341-42 (2014). A second line of research shows a decline in the persistence of private equity
sponsors’ performance from one fund to the next—an indication of increased competition in
the industry. See Reiner Braun, Tim Jenkinson & Ingo Stoff, How Persistent Is Private Equity
Performance? Evidence from Deal-Level Data, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 273, 276 (2017). But see
Arthur Korteweg & Morten Sorensen, Skill and Luck in Private Equity Performance, 124 J.
FIN. ECON. 535, 555 (2017). Finally, there is considerable evidence that private equity returns
are highly cyclical, which calls into question the view that private equity offers significant
diversification benefits relative to investing in public equities. See Viral V. Acharya, Julian
Franks & Henri Servaes, Private Equity: Boom and Bust?, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 44, 46
(2007); Andrew Ang et al., Estimating Private Equity Returns from Limited Partner Cash
Flows, 73 J. FIN. 1751, 1751 (2018).
18
See Ang et al., supra note 17, at 1782 (concluding that volatility for private equity is at
least as high as for standard equity indices, and that private equity is akin to a levered
investment in small and mid-cap equities); Daniel Rasmussen, Private Equity: Overvalued
and Overrated?, AM. AFF., Spring 2018, at 4.
19
See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 115, 120-21 (2013); Victoria Ivashina & Anna Kovner, The Private Equity Advantage:
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private equity approach more obvious than in its failures in the retail industry,
culminating painfully in the 2017 bankruptcy of Toys “R” Us.20 In lieu of
making the major investments needed to transition brick-and-mortar retailers
into the e-commerce age, private equity funds combatted their lower prospects
of generating returns by doubling down on the use of leverage.21
Indeed, private equity firms appear to be responding to their newly
competitive environment not by increasing their efforts at governance, but by
switching tactics to drive returns and even branching out into new asset classes.22
Large private equity firms now simultaneously run LBO funds, credit funds, real
estate funds, alternative investments funds, and even hedge funds.23 They create
new industries by pushing for the privatization of traditional government
services.24 In a stunning role reversal, they have even begun underwriting major
corporate loans.25 Along the way, even their own governance structure has
changed: several of the largest private equity firms are now themselves public
companies26—a tacit acknowledgment by the industry that private ownership is
not destiny for all firms. All this is to say that “private equity” has become a
misnomer for the industry.
Ironically, in comparison to governance and operational improvements, these
new strategies may in fact play better to the built-in advantages of the larger
private equity firms: extraordinary financial sophistication; deep and lucrative
connections to financing sources; and, perhaps, the ability to time markets.27 Nor
should we be surprised at how quickly the private equity industry is evolving:

Leveraged Buyout Firms and Relationship Banking, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2462, 2462-63
(2011).
20
See Paul Sullivan, 3 Investments That May Have Hit Their Peak, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/your-money/investment-private-equity-venture
-capital.html.
21
See id.
22
See infra Section III.A.
23
See Andrew F. Tuch, The Remaking of Wall Street, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 315, 342
(2017).
24
See Danielle Ivory, Ben Protess & Griff Palmer, In American Towns, Pumping Private
Profits from Public Works, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2016, at A1; Brian Alexander, Privatization
Is Changing America’s Relationship with Its Physical Stuff, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/infrastructure-private-public-partners
hips/533256/.
25
See Mark Vandevelde, Private Equity, Public Lenders, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2018, at 7;
Marcel Grupp, Taking the Lead: When Non-Banks Arrange Syndicated Loans 3 (Sustainable
Architecture for Fin. in Eur., Working Paper No. 100, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=26021
96.
26
See Kevin Dowd, Private Equity Goes Public: A History of PE Stock Performance,
PITCHBOOK (May 20, 2016), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/private-equity-goes-publica-history-of-pe-stock-performance [https://perma.cc/58TR-E67V].
27
See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 123.
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its compensation scheme incentivizes private equity managers to pursue returns
regardless of their source.28
The difficulty is that some of the new money-making strategies are less likely
to be value increasing than the traditional governance optimization approach.29
Moreover, they introduce conflicts of interest and complexities that alter private
equity’s role in corporate governance.30 Private equity’s governance advantage
has always been to ensure that companies are the servant of only one master.
Yet today the master itself may have divided loyalties and attention. With few
gains left to be had from governance reforms, private equity is quietly distancing
itself from the corporate governance revolution that it helped bring about.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the heyday of private
equity’s traditional strategy of optimizing firms’ governance and operations.
Part II explains how competition from inside and outside the industry is pushing
private equity away from its traditional focus on governance. Part III briefly
describes how private equity has altered its strategies and how the resulting
complexity and conflicts of interest create uncertainty as to private equity’s role
in corporate governance going forward.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL GOVERNANCE APPROACH: THE GOLDEN AGE

Private equity has undeniably played a key role in the dramatic transformation
of U.S. corporate governance over the last few decades. Beginning with the very
first major LBOs in the 1980s, private equity’s salvo signaled the beginning of
the end of uncontested managerialism in the United States. Public companies
were put on notice that even if their shareholders were asleep at the wheel, they
would nonetheless have to pay heed to shareholder value or risk a takeover.31 In
the so-called middle market, by contrast, private equity firms generally targeted
private companies lacking financial and managerial experience.32 Family-owned
businesses, for example, made highly attractive targets for LBOs, ideally
combining a sound business model with inefficient operations or an inefficient
capital structure.33

28

See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2008) (describing typical compensation scheme for
private equity funds).
29
See infra Part III.
30
See infra Part III.
31
See Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate
Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 51-52 (1988) (describing
active market for corporate control in 1980s).
32
John L. Chapman & Peter G. Klein, Value Creation in Middle-Market Buyouts: A
Transaction-Level Analysis, in PRIVATE EQUITY: FUND TYPES, RISKS AND RETURNS, AND
REGULATION 229, 245-46 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2011).
33
See Bloom, Sadun & Van Reenen, supra note 9, at 442 (using survey evidence to show
that private equity-owned companies adopt better management practices than similar familyowned companies).
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In both cases—the massive public-company LBO and the acquisition of
smaller private companies—private equity ownership could result in major
improvements in the target company. This Part briefly describes this ideal
version of private equity, in which private equity firms make substantial valueincreasing contributions to their portfolio companies’ governance and
operations.
A.

Efficient Governance

When Professor Michael Jensen predicted the “[e]clipse of the [p]ublic
[c]orporation” in 1989, he did so with private equity in mind as the ideal
alternative governance model for firms.34 Ever since Berle and Means published
their classic treatise on corporations, the perceived defect of public company
governance has been the problem of the separation of ownership and control.35
While raising capital from the general public can lower a firm’s cost of capital
and allow it to reach significant scale, it is incompatible with investors
themselves managing the firm. Equityholders must instead delegate
management of the firm to hired managers. While unquestionably more efficient
than management by dispersed shareholders, delegated management introduces
its own problem, referred to as the agency costs of management.36 Because
dispersed public-company shareholders have little incentive or ability to monitor
management closely, managers have the opportunity to privilege their personal
interests over shareholders’ interests.37
The birth of private equity offered a brilliant solution to this conundrum:
private equity funds were able to raise or borrow enough capital to finance even
very large companies, without resorting to dispersed share ownership. Typically,
a private equity firm (or “sponsor”)—a team of investment professionals—
forms a fund to pool equity capital, primarily from institutional investors.38 The
fund then uses this capital, along with a large proportion of borrowed funds, to
acquire and hold portfolio companies for several years.39 Although the private
34

Jensen, supra note 2, at 61.
See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 277-79 (1933).
36
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976)
(introducing concept of agency costs).
37
Id. at 308-09.
38
See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 123. For a comprehensive description of, and
justification for, the structure of investments funds—including private equity funds—see John
Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and
Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014) (explaining why investment pools and their managers
are segregated into different entities).
39
Leverage is a key feature of private equity investments. Anywhere from thirty to seventy
percent of the target company’s capital structure will be comprised of loans or bonds issued
by the target in connection with the acquisition by the private equity fund. See Kaplan &
Strömberg, supra note 7, at 124-25.
35
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equity fund may have a large number of investors, the fund itself serves as the
sole equity owner of each portfolio company, and decision-making by the fund
is in the hands of a single manager: the private equity sponsor.
Thus, in Jensen’s view, private equity acquisitions had the considerable
advantage of reuniting ownership and control in large firms, by replacing
dispersed shareholders with a sole owner that was also the sole manager. To be
sure, this description of private equity was in some respects inaccurate even at
the time when Jensen was writing. Private equity firms do not actually run their
portfolio companies on a day-to-day basis; they delegate to hired officers just as
public-company boards do.40 Yet by staffing the board, they are at least directly
responsible for key decision-making and the hiring and oversight of the officers.
Described below are the various governance contributions that private equity
firms can make to their portfolio companies, in the ideal case.
1.

Better Monitoring

With private equity, dispersed, passive shareholders are replaced by a single
shareholder that has the resources and incentives to monitor corporate officers
closely.41 First, private equity portfolio company boards look and behave
differently than public-company boards.42 The former are smaller—composed
exclusively or primarily of principals of the private equity firm—and they meet
comparatively frequently.43 Most importantly, unlike directors serving on
public-company boards, the economic stakes for directors of private equity
portfolio companies are very high. Private equity firms generally staff the board
of a portfolio company with the lead principals responsible for the investment,
and they intentionally tie these principals’ compensation closely to the portfolio
company’s success.44
In addition, private equity has a built-in mechanism to ensure that managers
remain disciplined: the heavy debt loads that they impose on their portfolio
companies. Unlike public-company managers in Michael Jensen’s caricature,
who oversee bloated corporate empires flush with cash, the discretion of
portfolio company officers is severely constrained.45 With major debt payments

40
See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770 (2017).
41
See Bloom, Sadun & Van Reenen, supra note 9, at 442-43 (concluding that private
equity ownership is associated with improved monitoring, based on survey data from thirtyfour countries).
42
See Francesca Cornelli & Ōguzhan Karakas, Private Equity and Corporate
Governance: Do LBOs Have More Effective Boards?, in 1 GLOBALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVE
INVESTMENTS WORKING PAPERS VOLUME 1: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRIVATE
EQUITY REPORT 2008, at 65, 72 (World Econ. Forum ed., 2008).
43
See id. at 66.
44
See id. at 72-73.
45
See Jensen, supra note 1, at 324 (describing how firm leverage can be used to constrain
management and thereby reduce agency costs).
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always looming on the horizon, officers must manage cash carefully and operate
as leanly as possible.
2. Better Incentives
Much of the claimed difficulty with dispersed share ownership in public
companies lies in the divergence between the incentives of shareholders and
those of managers. By contrast, the private equity model does much to realign
the incentives of corporate officers with those of the shareholder (the private
equity fund, and, indirectly, the institutional investors invested in the private
equity fund). Evidence suggests that: (1) they are willing to pay managers more,
as a percentage of the value of the business, than public-company shareholders;
(2) the compensation is more heavily tilted toward equity compensation,
creating “high-powered” incentives for managers; and (3) vesting and payout
are tied to major liquidity events for the company, prompting all parties to work
toward a favorable exit for the private equity fund.46
B.

Efficient Operations

Private equity firms do not pursue good governance for its own sake. The
goal, of course, is for private equity’s governance advantage to translate into an
advantage in firm value, including through greater operational efficiency. This
is the theory of private equity most often promoted by the industry itself and its
proponents: private equity ownership leads to more efficient firms.47 There are
several plausible paths from governance to firm value in this case. First, better
incentivized, smaller, and more focused boards might make better strategic
decisions for the firm, with respect to major corporate events such as mergers
and acquisitions (“M&A”) and product lines.48 Second, private equity firms may
be more willing than typical management to make difficult decisions that
improve operational efficiency, such as approving layoffs, spinning off
underperforming divisions, and even replacing top executives.49 Most
46
See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 130-31; Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S.
Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives
on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 251-52 (2009).
47
See, e.g., Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating
Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 217-18 (1989); EY, Private Equity CFOs Rank
Operational Efficiency as Top Priority, But Take Varied Approaches to Technology, Talent
Management and Outsourcing to Achieve It, CISION: PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 24, 2018, 12:01
PM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/private-equity-cfos-rank-operational-effic
iency-as-top-priority-but-take-varied-approaches-to-technology-talent-management-andoutsourcing-to-achieve-it-300587198.html [https://perma.cc/3GE5-4CP4].
48
See supra note 42-44 and accompanying text.
49
See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 132 (describing one study’s finding that in
private equity portfolio companies with poorly performing management, “one-third of chief
executive officers . . . are replaced in the first 100 days while two-thirds are replaced at some
point over a four-year period”). Unlike other corporate management, private equity firms tend
not to have any personal stakes or close personal relationships in their portfolio companies,
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significantly, private equity firms are incentivized by their compensation
arrangement with their own investors to maximize their portfolio companies’
leverage,50 something that public-company managers have been more reluctant
to do. Because managers at public companies may lose not only their jobs but a
significant portion of their wealth (assuming that they hold company stock) if
their firm goes bankrupt, they have incentives to keep the firm’s leverage low
relative to the optimum predicted by finance theory.51 In this view, private equity
firms are more likely to optimize a firm’s capital structure than public-company
managers, thereby capturing the tax advantages of debt financing over equity
financing and necessitating lean operations.52
Thus, the ideal of private equity-style corporate governance is a model in
which the incentives of owners and managers are tightly aligned, the owner
closely monitors the corporate officers, and the private equity firm brings
expertise and efficiency to the firm’s capital structure and operations. The next
Part describes how intense competition from within and without the private
equity industry means that private equity’s traditional governance strategy
should no longer be expected to generate the same high returns as in prior
decades, and that the space for private equity sponsors to make governance
improvements in the first place has narrowed considerably.
II.

COMPETITION IN THE LBO SPACE: ANYTHING YOU CAN DO I CAN DO
BETTER

By many measures, it is the best of times for private equity. Now considered
an established asset class, private equity attracts substantial allocations of capital
from institutional investors of all types. Recent fundraising continues to break
records, leaving many sponsors to turn away investors’ money rather than chase
it.53 And while interest rates may be inching upward as U.S. monetary policy
tightens, they remain low by historical standards, allowing private equity funds
because they do not found companies and because they acquire companies with the intention
to exit the investment within a few years.
50
Private equity firms typically receive a significant portion (e.g., twenty percent) of the
profits from any of their funds’ investments, but do not bear any losses. Id. at 123-24. This
option-like compensation rewards risk-taking by the private equity firm, including through
tactics such as using leverage. See id.
51
See Jensen, supra note 1, at 324 (explaining why public-company management has
private incentives to minimize their firms’ debt loads); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at
140-41 (finding that private equity-owned companies use more debt in their capital structure
than comparable public companies).
52
See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 134-35, 140-41. It is often also claimed that
private equity firms increase operational efficiency by contributing their own expertise or by
hiring industry experts to join the executive teams of their portfolio companies. This
advantage is somewhat less plausible, however. It is unclear why private equity principals
primarily trained in finance would have an advantage in achieving operational efficiency over
public-company managers with significant industry experience or with equal access to
external experts.
53
See BAIN & CO., supra note 16, at 2.
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to make the highly levered acquisitions that the private equity business model
envisions.54
Upon closer inspection, however, private equity today appears to be a victim
of its own success. Competition from inside and outside the asset class threatens
both its highly touted returns and its governance advantage.
Within the industry, the number of private equity funds and investor inflows
continue to skyrocket.55 If the funds raised outpace the value-increasing
opportunities for private equity investments, as many observers now claim is
likely, then investor returns will necessarily decline.56 Private equity is well past
its halcyon days as a small, select club of sponsors that could not avoid making
money if they tried. Today’s private equity industry is a crowded space indeed,
running the gamut from one-person shops to the massive fund groups.
Competition among buyout funds for acquisition targets is so severe that the
industry is struggling to deploy the staggering amounts of capital (or “dry
powder”) that it has raised.57 As one would expect for an increasingly
competitive industry, the empirical evidence suggests that the private equity
industry’s longer-term trends are towards lower returns (or, more precisely,
returns similar to those of investing in public companies).58
To be sure, while greater competition among private equity sponsors means
lower returns, it does not necessarily follow that sponsors will devote less
attention to governance in the aggregate—just as lower profits for producers in
any competitive market do not entail less production overall. A better
explanation for private equity’s turn away from governance is that there are now
fewer opportunities for governance improvements in the first place. Indeed, what
has received less attention than private equity’s internal competition is the severe
competition that it now faces from outside the industry, in particular from other
types of investment funds and from strategic acquirers. This Part describes the
key external forces that are chipping away at private equity’s corporate
governance advantage.
A.

Activist Hedge Funds

If private equity is to generate above-market returns from reforming public
companies’ governance, it requires a large pool of public companies with
suboptimal governance that are also feasible targets for an LBO.59 Specifically,
buyout funds ideally seek mature public companies with stable cash flows;
assets that are easy to use as collateral; disloyal, incompetent, or inexperienced
management; a suboptimal (e.g., cash-heavy) capital structure; inefficient
operations and strategy; and inefficient management compensation schemes. For
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 3, 29.
See Espinoza, supra note 15.
See id.
See BAIN & CO., supra note 16, at 3.
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
See Jensen, supra note 2, at 65.
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several reasons, these conditions are significantly less likely to be satisfied than
in private equity’s early years. The gradual disappearance of retail investors
directly holding stock in public companies means that ownership of public
companies today is not only predominantly institutional, but increasingly
concentrated.60 As a result, the collective action problems that long prevented
shareholders from successfully monitoring management are rapidly dissipating.
While early predictions of a wave of activism in the 1990s by institutional
investors such as mutual funds proved premature, it is undeniable that
institutional investors have flexed their collective muscles since then and
profoundly affected public-company governance.61
Activist hedge funds especially have established themselves as crusaders for
shareholder interests, displaying not only the incentives but the ability to monitor
public-company managers and to force their hand on key corporate events.62 For
each type of advantage claimed by private equity—governance-related,
financial, operational, or strategic—activist hedge funds may plausibly claim to
do the same or better.63
First, on the corporate governance front, activist hedge funds may make a
wide range of contributions. They are well known for toppling underperforming
directors and CEOs of even the largest U.S. public companies, using tactics
ranging from friendly negotiations with boards to full-blown proxy fights.64
Further, they arguably improve the functioning of public-company boards.
When activist-sponsored candidates serve on boards, they tend to be better
incentivized than their fellow directors.65 And rather than relying solely on
management for information, like traditional board members do, activist hedge
funds often seek out or even generate their own sources of information, for
example by conducting interviews of the target company’s former employees.66
Separately, they have played a significant role in reducing barriers to shareholder

60

Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 874-75.
See id. at 886-87.
62
See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1731-32 (2008).
63
To clarify, this Article makes no claims as to the overall social welfare effects of either
hedge funds or private equity, which are heavily debated. Rather, the focus here is on their
respective impacts on firm value.
64
See Brav et al., supra note 62, at 1732.
65
See Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the
Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 670 (2016).
66
For example, in its campaign against Darden Restaurants, activist hedge fund Starboard
Value interviewed former employees of Olive Garden at length in preparing its white paper
criticizing management. See STARBOARD VALUE, TRANSFORMING DARDEN RESTAURANTS 64
(2014), http://www.shareholderforum.com/dri/Library/20140911_Starboard-presentation.p
df [https://perma.cc/L3BX-DEN6].
61
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democracy; for example, by campaigning against staggered boards and poison
pills.67
Second, if private equity’s governance advantage stems largely from its
greater willingness to employ leverage, then activist hedge funds are preempting
private equity firms here as well. Increased payout to shareholders is a frequent
rallying cry for activist hedge funds, and higher payout tends to increase a firm’s
leverage, whether or not it is accompanied by new borrowing.68 Hedge fund
activists increase payout ratios by demanding increased dividends or share
repurchases (“buybacks”) from the firms they target.69
Third, activist hedge funds may act directly on firm operations, by
encouraging cost-cutting measures such as slashing R&D budgets or reducing
the firm’s workforce—tactics that are straight from the private equity
playbook.70 Activist hedge funds have recently targeted companies such as
Apple, DuPont, Google, and Microsoft for their high R&D expenditures.71 The
stated rationale for these measures is to remedy managers’ inherent tendencies
toward overconfidence, empire building, and other agency problems,72 which is
precisely the same rationale originally used to justify LBOs.
Fourth, and finally, like private equity funds, activist hedge funds often push
companies to make major strategic decisions, including pursuing M&A
transactions and spin-offs.73
Crucially, the zone of influence of activist hedge funds is not limited to the
firms that they target. Instead, managers at any public company that is a potential
target of an activist campaign have incentives to unilaterally adopt activistfriendly policies—such as high payout, cost reductions, and sales of
underperforming assets or divisions—in order to stave off an actual campaign
67
See Brav et al., supra note 62, at 1744. On the other hand, many view the current trend
toward dual-class stock—a device that nakedly entrenches corporate insiders—as a reaction
to the widespread influence of activist shareholders.
68
See id. at 1771 (discussing the activist strategy of increasing payouts). As shareholder’s
equity declines through payout, the portion of the firm’s capital structure represented by debt
increases (unless firm is entirely equity-financed, in which case greater payout simply causes
the firm to shrink in size). See id.
69
Id.
70
See id. at 1741.
71
Alon Brav et al., How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation?, 130
J. FIN. ECON. 237, 238 n.5 (2018).
72
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1136 (2015). Contra John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia,
The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J.
CORP. L. 545, 548-52 (2016).
73
For example, hedge funds have pressed McDonald’s and Wendy’s to spin off major
assets; induced management changes at Heinz, KT&G, and Time Warner; and pushed for
M&A deals between companies such as Euronext and Deutsche Börse, Steve Madden and VF
Corporation, and their own acquisitions of firms such as Kmart and Circuit City. See Marcel
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1024-25, 1029-42 (2007).
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that might result in the loss of their jobs.74 Thus, although the aggregate capital
devoted to activist hedge funds is negligible in proportion to the total market
capitalization of U.S. public companies, activist hedge funds have had enormous
influence on public company governance.
Why is the rise of activist hedge funds problematic for the traditional private
equity model? The increasing overlap between the two ultimately decreases
investment opportunities for private equity. We need not resolve here whether
hedge fund activism actually increases value in public companies—a matter of
ongoing dispute—but only note that activist strategies are preempting those of
private equity and shrinking the pool of private equity targets. Stated simply,
activist hedge funds are leaving private equity firms with fewer public
companies to fix.
B.

Venture Capital Funds

While activist hedge funds have made public-company targets less attractive
or less available for private equity acquisitions, venture capital funds are doing
the same for many private-company targets. Venture capital and LBOs are
generally viewed as entirely distinct investment strategies.75 Venture capital
investments are traditionally made in early stage companies, where capital needs
are severe, cash flows are highly uncertain and often negative, and debtfinancing is therefore precluded.76 By contrast, private equity funds—referring
here to LBO funds—target mature companies with stable cash flows, which are
able to take on substantial debt loads.77 Thus, not only do venture capital and
private equity traditionally differ as to what stage in the firm lifecycle they favor,
they also differ as to what industries they target: venture capital investments are
heavily tilted toward the tech industry, for example, while LBO funds favor
industries such as retail.78
This division of labor has changed, however, in light of the long-term decline
in the proportion of public companies in the United States and the ongoing glut
of private capital.79 Venture capital and private equity are no longer ships
passing in the night. With founders choosing to keep their companies private
substantially longer than in prior decades, venture capital funds can no longer
74
See Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Short-Termism and Capital Flows 1 (Harv.
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 17-062, 2017), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_
center/papers/pdf/Fried_897.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4FG-6YPA] (noting that activist tactics
“impact any firm that might be targeted by activist shareholders, not just those that are actually
targeted”).
75
See, e.g., Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 121; Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda,
Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey, 17 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 619, 619 (2011).
76
See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture
Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461, 1461 (1995).
77
See id. at 1472.
78
See id. at 1471.
79
See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J.
FIN. ECON. 464, 472-73 (2017).
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rely on a rapid initial public offering (“IPO”) exit from their successful
investments.80 Rather, private firms may go through multiple rounds of venture
capital financing, with ever longer holding periods, until they finally exit
through an IPO or, more likely, a sale to a strategic acquirer.81
The upshot is that many firms that, in prior decades, would have been natural
targets for private equity acquisitions are today still in venture capital funds’
hands, and the latter show little sign of letting go.82
C.

Strategic Acquirers

Private equity arguably faces its most severe competition from so-called
strategic acquirers—ordinary operating companies (as opposed to “financial”
investors such as private equity funds) that are on the lookout for potential
acquisition targets. M&A transactions by strategic acquirers have dramatically
outpaced IPOs in recent years; after recovering from the financial crisis of 20082009, U.S. companies found themselves with excess cash on their balance
sheets, ready to be deployed.83 Acquisitions have proven to be a popular
strategy; technological change and globalization entail increasing economies of
scale and scope for firms,84 while relatively weak antitrust enforcement has
made industry consolidation attractive.85
In one respect, the rise in strategic acquisitions is good for private equity: big
companies overburdened with cash will snatch up portfolio companies when
their private-equity-fund owners are looking to sell.86 This benefit at the exit
stage is more than offset, however, by the fact that strategic acquirers compete
80
See Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 11, at 1672; Scott Kupor, Where Have All the IPOs
Gone?, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (June 19, 2017), https://a16z.com/2017/06/19/ipos/ [https://
perma.cc/2TBU-JXMS].
81
See Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 11, at 1690.
82
More generally, to the extent that we are in the midst of a long-term economic shift away
from retail and towards the tech and health care/drug industries—a matter of some debate—
then venture capital will increasingly be the funding source of choice for firms.
83
See Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 11, at 1672; Juan M. Sánchez & Emircan Yurdagul,
Why Are Corporations Holding So Much Cash?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Jan. 2013),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/january-2013/why-arecorporations-holding-so-much-cash [https://perma.cc/33BR-ZJKR].
84
See Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 11, at 1664.
85
See Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust
Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13, 13 (2012); William A. Galston & Clara
Hendrickson, A Policy at Peace with Itself: Antitrust Remedies for Our Concentrated,
Uncompetitive Economy, BROOKINGS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/apolicy-at-peace-with-itself-antitrust-remedies-for-our-concentrated-uncompetitive-economy/
[https://perma.cc/7RDN-CNXU]; Kadhim Shubber, US Antitrust Enforcement Falls to
Slowest Rate Since 1970s, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/27a0a34ef2a0-11e8-9623-d7f9881e729f.
86
See Han T.J. Smit, Acquisition Strategies as Option Games, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.
79, 82 (2001) (describing how exits available to private equity firm under “buy-and-build”
strategy are either to sell to strategic buyer or financial buyer or to pursue IPO).
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with private equity firms to make portfolio investments in the first place.87
Because strategic acquirers typically expect substantial synergies (such as
economies of scale and scope) or other profit opportunities from an acquisition
(such as eliminating a competitor), they can afford to pay significantly more than
the current value of the target firm as a stand-alone entity.88 Financial buyers
such as private equity firms do not have that luxury, because they typically
continue to hold the target firm post-acquisition as a stand-alone entity.89 It is
therefore crucial for their investors’ returns that the private equity fund not
overpay for the target from the outset.
But with strategic acquirers lurking around every corner today, private equity
firms are regularly competing head-to-head with them for acquisitions, causing
private equity firms either to lose out on many investment opportunities or to
dramatically overpay for them.90 With consolidation being the strategy du jour
in many industries,91 strategic acquirers are very likely to set the price in the vast
majority of auctions for target companies, which is bad news for private equity.92
Of course, while strategic acquirers have the advantage of synergies, private
equity acquirers have traditionally had the advantage of leverage.93 Because
debt-financing is tax-advantaged relative to equity financing,94 and strategic
acquirers are relatively less likely to make leveraged acquisitions, private equity
firms have at times been able to beat strategic acquirers for attractive targets,
despite the absence of synergies.95 Here again, however, trouble is looming for
private equity. The dramatic decrease in U.S. corporate income tax rates
(courtesy of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017)96 has been heralded by the
private equity industry and its advisors as a major boon to the industry simply
because most private equity portfolio companies, like all other corporations, will
now pay less in tax. This misses a fundamental point, however: lower corporate

87

See Jana P. Fidrmuc et al., One Size Does Not Fit All: Selling Firms to Private Equity
Versus Strategic Acquirers, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 828, 829 (2012) (describing differing
characteristics and incentives of private equity and strategic buyers).
88
See Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts
Bidding Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 1980 (2008); BAIN &
CO., supra note 16, at 5.
89
See Bartlett III, supra note 88, at 2003.
90
See BAIN & CO., supra note 16, at 5.
91
For example, nearly half of all externally acquired inventions in the pharmaceutical
industry are obtained through M&A. See Ashish Arora, Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh,
The Acquisition and Commercialization of Invention in American Manufacturing: Incidence
and Impact, 45 RES. POL’Y 1113, 1113 (2016).
92
See Richard Dobbs, Marc Goedhart & Hannu Suonio, Are Companies Getting Better at
M&A?, MCKINSEY Q. (Dec. 2006), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/igiddy/articles/better_merge
rs.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWJ8-D5CV].
93
See Bartlett III, supra note 88, at 2017.
94
Id. at 1985.
95
Id. at 2010-11.
96
Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2096 (2017).

1112

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1095

tax rates mean less of an advantage to debt financing over equity financing,97
and therefore less of an advantage to private equity bidders over strategic
acquirers. Thus, the boon of the new tax regime is better viewed as a bane for
private equity, by making it that much harder for private equity funds to compete
with strategic acquirers when bidding for target companies.98
Viewed another way, the M&A market today is all grown up: private equity
no longer has an advantage over other players in terms of sourcing deals,
optimizing financing and taxation, or otherwise, simply by virtue of having
repeated experience with M&A transactions. As a consequence, it will be
increasingly difficult for LBO funds to get their foot in the door with the
dwindling share of attractive targets.
To summarize this Part, external competition is leaving private equity with
fewer opportunities and incentives to pursue governance improvements in U.S.
companies. The next Part examines private equity’s response to its new
competitive environment.
III. CONFLICTS AND COMPLEXITY
In a 2009 article, Professors William Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson
identified the beginnings of a shift in the private equity model, namely an
expansion from LBOs into other strategies and even other asset classes.99 The
authors further warned of the resulting potential for new conflicts of interest
involving private equity sponsors.100 The article proved remarkably prescient—
the phenomenon it describes has raised concerns for private equity’s investors
and regulators ever since.
This increase in conflicts is only one aspect of the changing face of private
equity in response to competition. This Part briefly describes these conflicts as
well as other developments that are likely to alter the industry’s impact on
corporate governance. These changes do not simply mean that private equity
will likely devote less attention to governance going forward. This Part explains
why the new private equity strategies could potentially have an ambiguous or
even negative governance impact.

97
For purposes of calculating their income tax, corporations may generally deduct interest
payments to their debtholders, whereas they may not deduct payments (such as dividends or
stock repurchases) to their shareholders. See Bartlett, supra note 88, at 1987. Thus, all else
being equal, there is a substantial tax advantage to the corporation from financing itself with
debt, rather than with equity. Moreover, the higher the then-applicable corporate income tax
rates, the greater the amount of tax savings for any given dollar amount of interest payments.
98
In addition, the new rules from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that limit the deductibility of
interest in highly leveraged companies are unambiguously bad for private equity.
99
William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment
Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 45 (2009).
100
See id. at 54-55.
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Beyond LBOs

Corporate governance was an obvious focal point for private equity firms
when their sole investment strategy was to sell companies for more than they
paid for them. If better governance caused firm value to increase either directly
(by reducing managerial shirking, for example), or indirectly (by leading to more
efficient operations), then it would boost private equity returns, and the
sponsors’ investment professionals would be incentivized ex ante to chase them.
However, intense competition and the shrinking set of opportunities for
governance improvements have prompted the larger private equity firms to
branch out from LBOs to other strategies and even other asset classes.101 In fact,
private equity sponsors no longer require control of their portfolio
investments—they are increasingly content to partner with other investors and
to take minority stakes in companies, even public ones.102 Given that monitoring
incentives increase and decrease with the size of equity investments103 and that
minority investments offer lower returns relative to buyouts,104 we should expect
private equity firms to play a lesser role in firm governance for these minority
investments.
As discussed, the largest private equity firms now sponsor funds in a wide
array of asset classes—anything from real estate to commodity futures. Most
strikingly, many now manage both equity and debt funds.105 Apollo, Blackstone,
and KKR each have more assets in their credit funds than in their equity funds.106
On the one hand, this reflects a rational response to overcrowding in the LBO
space, and it capitalizes on private equity firms’ financial sophistication and
ability to navigate the capital markets. On the other, credit funds have very
different incentives and require different expertise than equity funds. For that
reason, they have traditionally been the domain of hedge funds or specialized
credit-fund sponsors.
Holding both equity and debt positions creates conflicts of interest for the
sponsor. In highly leveraged businesses, which is where these funds invest,
debtholders’ interests may diverge significantly from those of the
equityholders.107 This makes it all the more remarkable that private equity
sponsors may manage funds that are simultaneously invested in the equity and
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See Tuch, supra note 23, at 340-41.
See Guojun Chen et al., Sources of Value Gains in Minority Equity Investments by
Private Equity Funds: Evidence from Block Share Acquisitions, 29 J. CORP. FIN. 449, 449-50
(2014); Tuch, supra note 23, at 340-41.
103
See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,
94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 462-63 (1986).
104
See Benjamin Puche & Christoph Lotz, Private Equity Minority Investments, 18 J. PRIV.
EQUITY 46, 46-47 (2015).
105
See Tuch, supra note 23, at 354-55; Vandevelde, supra note 25.
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Tuch, supra note 23, at 356-57.
107
See James A. Brander & Michel Poitevin, Managerial Compensation and the Agency
Costs of Debt Finance, 13 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 55, 55 (1992).
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the debt of the same portfolio company.108 In such cases, investors in both the
equity fund and the credit fund will worry that the interests of the sponsor may
cause it to favor the other. Moreover, even if the equity and debt funds operate
independently and do not share information, the funds’ common affiliation
imposes risks on both sets of investors (such as negative treatment in
bankruptcy) that they may not have priced in.109
Beyond the obvious concerns for the respective fund investors, however, lies
a governance concern for the portfolio company itself. Ex ante, common
ownership of equity and debt from the outset reduces agency costs from the
classic shareholder-creditor conflict and could therefore increase firm value.110
The result may be different, however, if the common ownership arises ex post.
If a sponsor’s fund acquires the debt of a portfolio company already owned by
another of its funds, the agency costs have already been priced in and addressed
in the debt covenants. Common ownership at this stage may simply create
uncertainty about the portfolio company’s governance. While self-interested
investors are a given in corporate finance, conflicted investors are more
problematic, particularly when they have control. Conflicts create uncertainty as
to how the investor will ultimately behave and make it less likely that the
behavior will be value increasing for the company.
Even within the LBO strategy, the recent proliferation of funds entails intense
competition for investment opportunities. This exacerbates existing conflicts of
interest for any private equity firm that is simultaneously managing two or more
LBO funds. Traditionally, private equity firms negotiate with their investors for
the right to launch a new fund (a “successor fund”) with the same investment
strategy as the firm’s existing fund, once the latter has succeeded in deploying
most of its capital.111 But the extraordinarily favorable fundraising climate for
private equity has meant that private equity firms are successfully compressing
the time between funds from more than five years to less than three and a half.112
108

See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 99, at 57.
In particular, the debt fund investors should be concerned about equitable subordination
or debt recharacterization—the possibility that the bankruptcy court will choose to treat the
company debt held by the fund as equity, as a result of actions taken by the sponsor whose
fund also holds the company’s stock. See James W. Wilton & William A. McGee, The Past
and Future of Debt Recharacterization, 74 BUS. LAW. 91, 91-93 (2018).
110
See Wei Jiang, Kai Li & Pei Shao, When Shareholders Are Creditors: Effects of the
Simultaneous Holding of Equity and Debt by Non-Commercial Banking Institutions, 23 REV.
FIN. STUD. 3595, 3595 (2010) (finding evidence that loan spreads are relatively lower in firms
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(2019).
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This has several implications. Necessarily, a greater proportion of managers’
time is being taken up by fundraising, as opposed to investment analysis,
execution, and monitoring.113 Further, the conflicts that have long existed
between successor and predecessor funds are made more severe. Difficult
questions that arise include how a sponsor should allocate investment
opportunities among its various funds and whether the sponsor should be able to
cause its funds to buy and sell investments from one another.114
Not surprisingly, managing such conflicts now takes up a non-negligible
amount of both the principals’ and investors’ time. The fund disclosures and
provisions dealing with conflicted transactions have increased dramatically in
length.115 Yet even where the potential for such conflicts is extensively
disclosed, there will always remain some uncertainty on the investor side as to
how severe they will be in practice and how well the private equity firm will
navigate them.116 Investors in an LBO fund may not truly be prepared for the
possibility that the sponsor will take a position effectively adverse to theirs. The
recent enforcement actions by the SEC targeting conflicts of interest in private
equity funds suggest that even the most sophisticated private equity investors
can indeed be caught off guard by their sponsors’ behavior.117
Conflicts of interest are not bad per se. Private equity has lived with conflicts
of interest between the sponsor and fund investors from the beginning, as a result
of how the sponsor is compensated for advising the fund.118 These conflicts have
long been identified and managed, with varying success. Presumably, investors
view them as a necessary and acceptable tradeoff for the potential to earn high
returns.
What, then, distinguishes the new crop of conflicts created by private equity’s
shifting business model? First, they may significantly exacerbate private
equity’s existing conflicts, in today’s highly competitive environment. Second,
they are largely avoidable. Unlike the original conflicts of interest from the
113

See Toby Mitchenall, Capital Is Abundant, but Time Is Scarce, PRIV. EQUITY INT’L
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private equity compensation model, these conflicts reflect the sponsor’s own
decision to expand into different strategies and asset classes and to fundraise
more frequently. That decision in turn appears to benefit the sponsor more than
investors.
In the mutual fund context, the standard practice of having the fund group
manage a large number of different funds is justified by economies of scale: for
example, it allows the significant regulatory and compliance costs to be spread
across funds.119 Yet the argument for economies of scale is far less compelling
in the private equity world, which faces dramatically less regulation. As such, it
is not immediately clear why a LBO fund and a credit fund managed by the same
sponsor would be preferable for investors than two unaffiliated, specialized
sponsors. Moreover, the resulting conflicts are much harder for investors to
manage in the private equity world, because there is little direct regulation of
such conflicts, and because investors have very limited exit rights.120 Instead,
investors must rely almost exclusively on contract. Yet contracting around
burgeoning, ever-changing conflicts of interest is a difficult and costly
exercise.121
The advantage of private equity has always been its single-minded pursuit of
investor returns. But it is not always clear today which of their investors private
equity sponsors are working for. In fact, we have seen all of this before with
investment banks. For M&A advisory work, for example, boutique advisors
have been gaining market share from the major investment banks as clients seek
to avoid Wall Street’s myriad conflicts of interest.122 Will the same eventually
prove true of the major private equity sponsors? Will investors tire of trying to
predict which of the firms’ competing loyalties will prevail in any instance? In
the meantime, we are left with considerable uncertainty as to how private equity
conflicts affect the behavior and value of its portfolio companies.
B.

Organizational Complexity
Expansion into other asset classes is not the only driver of private equity’s
accelerating conflicts and complexity. Most private equity firms today are now
significantly bigger organizations, as a result not only of venturing into other
asset classes and jurisdictions,123 but also of regulatory change and investor
119
See Morley, supra note 38, at 1261 (arguing that investment adviser conflicts of interest
may reflect efficiency-enhancing economies of scale from offering multiple funds).
120
See id. at 1267.
121
See William W. Clayton, The Private Equity Negotiation Myth, 37 YALE J. ON REG.
(forthcoming) (arguing that terms of private equity limited partnership agreements are
unlikely to be efficiently negotiated, given that large investors routinely negotiate separate
terms in side letters).
122
See Weihong Song, Jie (Diana) Wei & Lei Zhou, The Value of “Boutique” Financial
Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions, 20 J. CORP. FIN. 94, 94 (2013); Dana Cimilluca & Telis
Demos, ‘Boutiques’ Thrive in M&A Advice, WALL STREET J. (June 26, 2014, 7:55 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boutiques-thrive-in-m-a-advice-1403823530.
123
Private equity sponsors are no longer simply the U.S.- and U.K.-based going-private
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demands. Until recently, private equity firms had a reputation for being leanly
staffed.124 Not only did this allow for more profits per investment professional,
it also ensured that the interests of each such investment professional would be
closely aligned with those of the private equity firm as a whole.
Today’s private equity firms often have a considerably larger workforce, and
one that is increasingly composed of non-investment professionals, in areas such
as marketing, legal, compliance, investor relations, government relations, and
human resources.125 Following Dodd-Frank, virtually all private equity firms
other than the very smallest are required to register as investment advisers under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.126 While the resulting regulatory burdens
on private equity firms are light compared to those for mutual fund advisers,127
they are not negligible, and they entail greater staffing needs.128 Accordingly,
major private equity firms today look less like the small, scrappy teams of yore
than like the large mutual fund advisers and investment banks.
This pronounced increase in size and scope necessarily introduces some
divergence between the interests of the individual investment principals that
make up the private equity firm and those of the private equity firm itself. This

specialists of the late 1980s. With Warburg Pincus as the possible exception that proves the
rule, the largest private equity shops have created specialized subdivisions and have raised
multiple concurrent funds in multiple countries, aimed at varying markets like Asian real
estate and mezzanine debt. Michael J. de la Merced & Peter Lattman, Warburg Stays in the
Fray, but off the Public Market, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 17, 2011, 9:07 PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/warburg-stays-in-fray-but-off-public-market/.
124
See Jensen, supra note 2, at 70.
125
As of the end of 2017, KKR employed 378 investment professionals out of 1,184
employees. KKR & Co. L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 26 (Feb. 23, 2018). In 2011,
217 out of KKR’s 916 employees were investment professionals. KKR & Co. L.P., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 20 (Feb. 27, 2012). Michael Jensen’s 1989 study found that KKR had
sixteen professionals and forty-four other employees. Jensen, supra note 2, at 70. Virtually
all of the Carlyle Group’s employee headcount increase of two hundred between 2012 and
2017 can be accounted for by non-investment professionals. Compare The Carlyle Group
L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 15, 2018), with The Carlyle Group L.P., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 14, 2013).
126
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (2012) (establishing the general registration requirement for
investment advisers); 17 CFR § 275.203(m)-1 (2018) (exempting from registration
requirement private fund advisers managing less than one hundred and fifty million dollars in
assets).
127
See Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years After the Dodd-Frank Act, 35
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 624, 631 (2016) (concluding that early fears about the burden of
Dodd-Frank on private investment funds were not borne out); Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi
& Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance?—Evidence
from 2010-2015 (July 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629347 (finding no support for the private fund industry’s claims
that Dodd-Frank had a negative effect on private fund earnings).
128
See Wulf A. Kaal, What Drives Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost for Private Funds?,
15 J. ALTERNATIVE INV. 8, 13 (2016) (providing cost estimates of Dodd-Frank compliance for
private investment advisers based on survey data).
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potentially poses problems for sponsors seeking to maintain a reputation for
good behavior towards their investors, creditors, and counterparties, such as by
avoiding conflicts or not exploiting them to the investors’ detriment.129 As
discussed, even the original private equity model involves inherent conflicts of
interest, but it is these conflicts that make a sponsor’s reputational capital
particularly valuable. Yet the recent growth in headcount creates the potential
for misaligned incentives internally, and therefore may make it harder for
sponsors to maintain their hard-earned reputations. This should be especially
true of the private equity firms that are themselves now public companies, such
as Apollo, Blackstone, Carlyle, and KKR.130 As with the investment banks, the
shift from being a private firm owned by its principals to a public company
should alter both organizational and individual behavior over time.131 While this
is likely to lead to a continued emphasis on profits for the sponsor, there may be
less agreement internally as to the means by which to achieve them and the
importance of the firm’s long-run reputational capital.132
C.

Contractual Complexity and Bespoke Arrangements

A further challenge for the private equity industry is the rapid increase in the
complexity of its contracts and arrangements with investors. Some of this, as we
have seen, results from increasing conflicts among the sponsors’ own funds.
Some results from tailoring to investor requests in the more competitive
environment. Growing dissatisfaction with the “two and twenty” compensation
scheme—which awards two percent per annum of the fund’s commitments and
a twenty percent share of all investment profits to the private equity manager—
has driven investors to alter their arrangements with private equity firms.133
Rather than reduce the rates charged by their funds (to “one and fifteen,” for
example), which would apply to their investors across the board, many firms
have instead begun providing different economic and other arrangements to

129
For a private equity sponsor, or any organization for that matter, acquiring and
maintaining reputational capital requires frequently forgoing short-term gain from “bad”
behavior, on the theory that having a good reputation will lead to greater gain in the long run.
However, the more the interests of the individuals making up the organization diverge from
the interests of the organization itself, the more difficult it will be for the organization to
maintain its reputation. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the
Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002).
130
Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1,
61-62 (2008).
131
See Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, The Demise of Investment Banking
Partnerships: Theory and Evidence, 63 J. FIN. 311, 311-12 (2008).
132
See Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, The Role of Private Equity Group
Reputation in LBO Financing, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 306 (2010) (showing that more reputable
private equity sponsors benefit from more favorable debt financing for their portfolio
companies).
133
For a description of this compensation scheme, see Fleischer, supra note 28, at 8.
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different investors.134 Thus, investors in the fund with more bargaining power
than the average investor negotiate for special arrangements in the form of side
letters, opportunities to co-invest in portfolio investments directly alongside the
fund, or even separate accounts (management of their capital entirely outside of
a fund structure).135
The complexity of these arrangements, and the time and resources needed to
negotiate and comply with them on an ongoing basis, are significant.136 Of
course, we should expect that in agreeing to such arrangements, each private
equity firm balances the costs and benefits of doing so. Yet now that it has
become standard practice for large investors to obtain tailored arrangements and
contracts, it is increasingly difficult for any individual sponsor to push back. The
market has only moved in one direction, namely toward greater individualization
and complexity.137 While individual investors have an incentive to negotiate for
separate rights from the sponsor, from the perspective of the industry as a whole,
this is unlikely to be efficient.138
This matters, because the complexity of a private equity sponsor’s internal
organization and of its external contractual commitments to investors makes it
less nimble—not only less focused on the investment side of the business,
perhaps, but also more constrained in its investment options to begin with. For
example, a side letter provision requiring the fund to excuse a particular investor
before making investments in certain industries could result in the fund
foregoing such investments entirely, even where there are profits to be made.
Thus, once again, we have less clarity today as to whether sponsors’ treatment
of any given portfolio company will be value-maximizing.

134
For example, anchor investors are able to negotiate for reductions in the management
fee percentage. See Ingo Stoff & Reiner Braun, The Evolution of Private Equity Fund Terms
Beyond 2 and 20, 26 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 65, 71-72 (2014).
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Cost of Private Equity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1847, 1885-86 (2018); Josh Lerner et al., Investing
Outside the Box: Evidence from Alternative Vehicles in Private Capital 3-4, 13-14 (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 19-012, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=3230145.
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Financial Games

Private equity sponsors’ incentives to generate returns of any kind and from
any source are generally viewed by investors as a positive feature of the industry.
Yet in a highly competitive environment, the pressure to show returns early and
often can ironically lead to behavior that is either neutral or bad for investors
and portfolio companies. Given private equity managers’ particular skillset, this
behavior often involves clever games with financing.139
Nowhere is this more evident than in the effort and resources devoted to
managing their funds’ internal rate of return (“IRR”). A fund’s IRR measures
the return on the capital that the fund invests in portfolio companies and other
investments.140 Importantly, for any given payoff from an investment, the IRR
figure decreases the longer the fund’s capital has been invested before the payoff
occurred.141 For example, assume that a fund invests one hundred million dollars
of its own capital in a portfolio company, and later nets one hundred and fifty
million dollars from selling it. The IRR in this case is significantly higher if the
company was sold one year after the fund acquired it, as opposed to five years
(all else being equal).
Predictably, then, private equity firms have realized that they can increase
their IRR in one of two ways. First, of course, they can produce higher returns.
Second, they can game the IRR calculation by realizing returns faster, or,
equivalently, by keeping investors’ money for a shorter amount of time.142 Now
that competition has made it challenging to produce high returns, private equity
firms have had to resort to the second option of shortening the holding period
for investors’ money. A now common way of achieving this is for private equity
funds to obtain capital call facilities from banks.143 Rather than call investor
capital at the time the fund plans to make an investment, the fund may instead
draw down on its capital call facility and use the borrowed funds to make the
investment instead. Eventually, the fund will call capital from investors and use
this to repay the loan from the bank. Borrowing to fund capital calls increases
the fund’s IRR by allowing the fund to shorten the period in which it holds its
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Private Equity, 12 J. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 55 (2008) (manuscript at 6),
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own investors’ capital, but because the fund must pay interest on the loan
facility, it is not necessarily beneficial to investors.
Capital call facilities originally were justified as very short-term borrowings
to allow private equity funds to make investments on short notice, given that
calling capital from investors typically requires fifteen days’ advance notice.144
Yet funds are now borrowing under these facilities for months at a time, funding
even large investments without their own investors’ capital.145 In principal, if
the fund can avoid calling capital until just before the investment is sold, the
fund’s resulting IRR will be infinite.146 Accordingly, empirical studies have
found that private equity funds’ IRRs tend to have an upward bias.147
Why is managing IRR so important to private equity sponsors? First, IRR is
the single most commonly-used measure of a fund’s performance, making it a
crucial component of the private equity firm’s marketing. For example, the
private placement memorandum for a new fund typically reports the IRR of the
sponsor’s predecessor funds in the same strategy.148 Second, the private equity
sponsor’s compensation depends on its funds’ IRRs. Private equity funds
typically distribute profits from their investments according to a specified
priority (the “waterfall”).149 The waterfall generally provides that limited
partners must recover their capital first, as well as an eight percent preferred
return on their invested capital, before the private equity manager may receive
any share of the profits.150 The preferred return is akin to an IRR calculation,
however.151 Thus, the more the firm boosts IRR, the sooner the private equity
manager can claim a share of the fund’s profits.
At worst, these sorts of financial games are a means for private equity
sponsors to deceive their own investors and potential investors. At best, they are
distractions from a fund’s core investment strategy. As such, they are perhaps
emblematic of private equity’s recent turn away from the traditional LBO
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strategy of improving firm governance and operations, towards alternate means
of showing returns.
CONCLUSION
Is private equity still special? Recent empirical studies call into question
whether private equity’s returns remain exceptional today among the major asset
classes. Yet we should also ask whether the means by which private equity
generates those returns remains the same today as during prior decades. This
Article argues that a combination of factors is pushing private equity away from
its original contribution of improving firms’ governance and operations, towards
a scattershot of tactics to boost returns. While reforming and restructuring
companies is what brought private equity fame, the industry has since moved on
to other things. To be clear, private equity is not going anywhere—it will remain
influential and a powerful draw for capital for the foreseeable future. Yet its
influence will likely be felt in areas other than corporate governance.

